Expert in Civil Procedure
Frederic Bloom joined Brooklyn Law School as an Associate Professor and is teaching Civil Procedure and Evidence. He most recently taught at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law as a Visiting Professor, and previously at Saint Louis University School of Law. His background also includes clerkships with Judge Sidney R. Thomas of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. A graduate of Washington University in St. Louis (where he triple majored and played soccer), Bloom received his J.D. from Stanford University Law School.
Bloom began his teaching career as a Junior High School teacher in his native Colorado, where he taught English and History. A natural in the classroom, Bloom said that his approach to teaching is a “soft” Socratic method. His goal is to get students to answer the questions succinctly and with confidence, and acquire a set of essential legal tools. “I hope that my students learn how to unpack cases, how to put policy together with application, and walk away with a coherent set of skills that they can apply to any set of legal problems with appropriate confidence. From a big picture perspective I hope they see that these are really terrific puzzles that aren’t easy to solve but are fun to engage.”
Bloom has produced an impressive record of scholarship that focuses on procedural issues and modern federal courts. His articles have appeared in the Cornell Law Review, Washington University Law Review, and the Saint Louis University Law Journal.
His most recent article, “Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie,” published in the Stanford Law Review, recounts jurisdiction’s foundations — its tests and motives, its histories and rules — and then seeks out jurisdictional reality, critically examining a side of jurisdiction he argues we too often overlook. “Legal jurisdiction may portray itself as fixed and unyielding, as natural as the force of gravity, and as stable as the firmest ground,” explained Bloom, “but jurisdiction is in fact something different. It is a malleable legal invention that bears a false rigid front.” In his article, Bloom explains the historical reasons for the veneer of logic behind jurisdiction. He concludes: “This study does not mean to excuse the inexcusable. It hopes instead to offer new insight on an old problem. And it helps to make sense of why jurisdiction’s lie has so long endured.”