About the Symposium
The 2008 financial crisis threatened the stability of financial institutions worldwide and focused attention on firms, financial or otherwise, that might be deemed “Too Big to Fail.” That crisis led directly to the creation, under the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Bill, of a “Resolution Authority” for non-bank entities whose failure might create systemic risk.
A stand-alone resolution authority was not the only option available to policy makers. Instead, the Bankruptcy Code might have been amended to facilitate the restructuring of such institutions, and other insurance schemes might have been considered. Indeed, in other countries, a variety of approaches has been followed.
This symposium will take a comparative look at the different strategies that have been used to deal with systemic risk, both domestically and abroad. The Resolution Authority will be considered in light of alternative domestic regimes, such as state insurance resolution, SIPC and the PBGC. The symposium will also consider the approaches followed in Germany, the UK, the EU generally, and Canada. Finally, the symposium will consider the sales of Chrysler and GM in bankruptcy.
Throughout, the symposium will consider the complex interaction between market discipline and the role of governments in maintaining financial market stability. Dodd-Frank is neither the starting point nor the end point of the theoretical and policy discussions, and this program will inform both.
Professor Edward J. Janger
Professor Roberta S. Karmel
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law was founded in 2005 as a student-run academic law journal, focusing on corporate, financial and commercial law subjects, including securities and bankruptcy law. The Journal hosts an annual symposium devoted to a business-related topic, at which current and significant questions of legal policy can be addressed by both academics and practitioners. The Journal publishes articles from leading scholars and student-prepared notes.