Note

6 J.L. & Pol'y 653, Vol. 2 (1998)

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 ("the Act") entered into effect on January 1, 1997. It enables the President to sign a comprehensive bill, giving the bill full effect, and then grants him the power to cancel specific spending provisions and tax benefit measures contained in the same legislation, provided that the cancellation will "reduce the federal budget deficit," does "not impair essential government functions," and does "not harm the national interest." The day after the Act became effective, four senators and two members of the House of Representatives ("the Legislators") joined together to challenge the Act's constitutionality in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The court accepted the Legislators argument that the Act created an unconstitutional conflict with the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. The Executive Branch immediately appealed the District Court's verdict to the Supreme Court of the United States. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court vacated the District Court's decision, holding that as Members of Congress, the Legislators lack standing to challenge the Act under Article III of the Constitution.

This Note argues that the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act conferred significant law making powers upon the Executive Branch to the direct detriment of each member of Congress' constitutionally reserved legislative functions. It posits that the Supreme Court failed to recognize that this transfer of power resulted in a sufficient Article III injury to compel federal court jurisdiction over the Raines complaint. This Note first reviews the Supreme Court's framework for making standing determinations. Further, it examines the stated purpose of the Act's judicial review clause and its impact on the justiciability of the Legislator's constitutional challenge. Ultimately, the Note analyzes the Supreme Court's Raines v. Byrd decision and criticizes the Court's rationale for denying the Legislators standing to challenge the Act, and needlessly engendering the constitutional cloud that continues to swirl around the line-item veto. It discusses the future of the Line Item Veto Act in the federal court system and speculates that despite sound policy goals, the Act will soon be found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Note concludes that the diminution of Congress' legislative powers caused by the Line Item Veto Act should have qualified as a sufficient injury to warrant federal court jurisdiction over the Legislators' constitutional challenge.