PAST ARTICLES AND EDITORIAL BOARDS
ELIMINATING A SAFE HAVEN FOR
DISCRIMINATION: WHY NEW YORK MUST
BAN PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES FROM
JURY SELECTION

Felice Banker

3 J.L. & Pol'y 605 (1995)

This Note argues, in accord with Justice Thurgood Marshall, "that the only way to eradicate the racial prejudice that peremptory challenges inject into the jury selection process is to eliminate them entirely." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Instead of deeming peremptory challenges unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court attempted to limit them to comport with guarantees of equal protection. In 1986, the Court announced a framework to quide lower courts in determining improper discrimination: The party alleging discrimination has the burden of making a prima facie showing that raises such an inference; the burder then shifts to the opposing party to rebut the inference by providing a neutral explanation for the challenged peremptory strikes. The trial judge must then determine whether the movant has proven purposeful discrimination.

However, the challenge to lower courts implementing the Batson framework has proven insurmountable due to insufficient guidance from the Supreme Court as to what constitutes a prima facie case and how to discern a race-neutral explanation. This Note argues that, even where lower courts have effectively formulated and used the Batson framework, as they have in New York State, Batson's attempt to accomodate the interests of achieving fair and impartial juries and abolishing discrimination from jury selection has been an exercise in futility. Because the peremptory challenge is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution, but rather is a creature of statutory state law, this Note proposes that the New York State legislature abrogate the peremptory challenge from the Criminal Procedure Law entirely to protect potential jurors' equal protection and civil rights.